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1.　Introduction
Since the early 1970s countries’ choices of exchange rate regime have significantly 
changed.　Immediately after the breakdown of the Breton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates in 1973 when the world’s major currencies began to float, most developed countries con-
tinued to peg their exchange rates to a single currency or a basket of currencies.　However, 
since the late 1970s, there has been a steady fal in the number of developing countries that 
maintain some type of formal pegged exchange rate, and a concomitant rise in the number of 
countries with more flexible regimes.
Explanations to account for this trend include: large exchange rate fluctuations among the 
major currencies that folowed the breakdown of the Breton Woods system, acceleration of 
inflation folowing oil shocks of the 1970s and 1980s, increases in capital mobility, and a series 
of external shocks including a steep rise in international interest rates, a slowdown of growth in 
the industrial countries, and the debt crisis.1)
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 1) The steady fal in the number of countries with soft pegs continued in the 1990s, but the shift was 
towards both floating rates and hard pegs.　For the group of 22 developed market economies 
(DME), 33 emerging market economies (EME), and other developing countries (0)16 the results 
are as folows: In 1991, 59 percent of developing countries had some kind of soft peg regime.　By 
1999, this proportion had falen to 34 percent while the share of floating regimes increased from 25 
to 42 percent, and the share of hard pegs from 16 to 24 percent.　The shift away from soft pegs 
and towards both corners is observed in al three country groups but a large part of the expansion on 
the hard peg side results from the creation of the EMU which reduced the number of DMEs with 
a soft peg regime from 11 to one.　The EMEs with a soft peg regime fel from 21 to 14.　Five of 
these (Indonesia, Thailand, Russia, Brazil, and Mexico) moved to floating regimes, and two 
(Argentina and Bulgaria) instituted currency board arrangements.　Among other developing 
countries, a larger shift has been towards flexibility; only six smal countries moved to hard peg 
regimes.
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The polarization in the currency regime choice has led some authors to conclude that soft 
peg regimes in countries open to international capital flows are not sustainable for extended peri-
ods, and that these countries should move away from the middle towards both extremes of the 
exchange rate spectrum where the risk is minimal (disappearing middle, two-corner solutions).　
Hence they must either float freely or fix truly and thus credibly under a hard peg regime.　In 
recent years, the “two-corner solution” has become a new orthodoxy in the choice of an 
exchange rate regime for developing countries.　The new orthodoxy has been chalenged by a 
number of authors (Frankel 1999, Cooper 1999, Edwards 2000, Wiliamson 2000).2)
The choice of whether to have a fixed or floating exchange rate regime remains a controver-
sial issue for many countries in the developing world.　According to research by David Field-
ing and Michael Bleaney, presented to the Royal Economic Society at the Annual Conference at 
Warwick University on Thursday 2 April, 1998, adherence to a fixed exchange rate does help 
keep inflation low.　At the same time, maintenance of a fixed exchange rate over a long period 
of time requires commitment to macroeconomic policies which ensure that balance of payments 
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 2) In particular, these authors have argued that: “comer solutions” are not free from problems: “corner 
solutions” may be appropriate under specific circumstances for a limited number of developing 
countries: moving away from soft pegs towards more flexibility does not mean free floating: and 
intermediate regimes are more likely to be appropriate for more countries than the corner solutions.　
A recent chalenge came from the French and Japanese finance ministries.　In a discussion paper 
jointly prepared for the Asia and European Finance Ministers’ meeting in January 2001, they 
pointed out the main shortcomings of the two extreme solutions and stated that an intermediate 
regime whereby the exchange rate moves within a given implicit or explicit band with its center 
pegged to a basket of currencies would be appropriate for many emerging market economies 
(ASEM 2001).　Such a regime should be backed by consistent and sustainable macroeconomic and 
structural policies and may be accompanied, for a certain period and under specific conditions, by 
market-based regulatory measures to curb excessive capital inflows.　Crocket 1994, Eichengreen 
1994, Obstfeld and Rogoft (1995), Summers 2000, Eichengreen 2000.　Fisher argued that the dis-
appearing middle is due to the logic of the impossible trinity (Fisher 2001).　Frankel and others 
(2000) stressed that the relative dificulty to verify the intermediate regimes, particularly the broad 
band regimes pegged to a basket of currencies, is also a critical factor to explain why intermediate 
regimes are less viable than the corner solutions.　Edwards (2000) noted: “From a historical per-
spective the curent support for the two-corner approach is largely based on the shortcomings of the 
soft pegs.., and not the historical merits of the two corner systems”.　Frankel (1999) observed: 
“Neither pure floating nor currency boards sweep away al the problems that come with modem 
globalized financial markets.　Central to the economists’ creed is that life always involves trade 
ofs.　Countries have to trade of the advantages of more exchange rate stability against the advan-
tages of more flexibility.　Idealy, they would pick the degree of flexibility that optimizes with 
respect to this trade of.　Optimization often, though not always, involves an interior solution”.　
See.　Frankel, J. A., “No single Currency Regime is Right for al Countries or at al Times”, 
NBER 1999: Edwards, ibidem.
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deficits do not persist.3)
Among the other factors influencing monetary growth, the most important is the degree of 
openness of the economy (that is, the size of international trade relative to the economy’s total 
output).　More open economies tend to have lower monetary growth rates, perhaps because the 
balance of payments disciplining mechanism is stronger.　A country in the top 5% with regard 
to openness can be expected to have a monetary growth rate about 4% lower than the average.
An important diference between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes is in the trans-
mission process linking monetary growth and real economic growth with inflation.　In theory, 
an increase in monetary growth or a reduction in real economic growth in a flexible exchange 
rate regime ought to lead to a proportionate increase in the inflation rate.　In a fixed exchange 
rate regime, the efects wil be less than proportionate because some prices (those of goods 
traded on international markets) wil not be influenced by what happens in the domestic 
economy.　Most macro data shows that a 1% increase in monetary growth in a fixed exchange 
rate system can be expected to increase the inflation rate by just 0.5%.4)
Yet litle consensus has emerged about how exchange rate regimes afect common mac-
roeconomic targets, such as inflation and growth.　At a theoretical level, it is dificult to estab-
lish unambiguous relationships because of the many ways in which exchange rates can 
influence and be influenced by other macroeconomic variables.　Likewise, empirical studies 
typicaly find no clear link between the exchange rate regime and macroeconomic performance.5)
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 3) Fielding and Bleaney examined the impact of the choice of exchange rate regime on inflation rates 
across 80 low and middle income countries.　They found that: The most direct influence of a fixed 
exchange rate is that it tends to encourage monetary discipline in a government since rapid mone-
tary expansion leads to painful balance of payments deficits.　Controling for other factors, the 
average fixed exchange rate country has a rate of monetary growth 12% lower than the average 
flexible exchange rate country.
 4) See “Exchange Rate Regimes, Monetary Discipline & Inflation”, by David Fielding and Michael 
Bleaney presented at the Royal Economic Society,1998, Annual Conference at Warwick University.　
Also compare with: Ghosh, A., Ostry, J, Gulde, A-M., Wolf, H. (1999), “Does the Exchange Rate 
Regime Mater for Inflation and Growth?”, Economic Issues No2, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington D.C.
 5) Wiliamson, J. “Estimating Equilibrium Exchange Rates”, Institute of International Economics, 
1994.　Also Wiliamson, J., “Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Markets: Reviving the Interme-
diate Option”, Institute for International Economics, September 2000; Schulstad, Paul, and Serrat, 
A. (1995), An Empirical Examination of a Multilateral Target Zone Model (Banco de Espana: 
Documento de Trabajo no. 9532).; Svensson, Lars E.O. (1992), “An Interpretation of Recent 
Research on Exchange Rate Target Zones”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4), Fal.　Tara-
pore Commitee (1997), Report of the Commitee on Capital Account Convertibility (Mumbai: 
Reserve Bank of India).　Ortiz, Guilermo, and Agustin Carstens (2000), “The Experience with a →
Osamu Kurihara and Chris Czerkawski
This paper is organized into four sections.　The first one gives an introduction to the topic, 
the second deals with terminology and periodization, the third one with macroeconomic adjust-
ments under diferent curency systems and the fourth one is a synthetic summary.
Apopreciation for Institute of Advanced Studies, Hiroshima Shudo University for financial 
assistance in publishing this paper
2.　Foreign Exchange Rate System, Terminology and Periodization
Beyond the traditional fixed-floating dichotomy lies a spectrum of exchange rate regimes.　
The de facto behavior of an exchange rate, moreover, may diverge from its de jure classification.　
While it is customary to speak of fixed and floating exchange rates, regimes actualy span a con-
tinuum, ranging from pegs to target zones, to floats with heavy, light, or no intervention.　The 
traditional dichotomy can mask important diferences among regimes.
Most current analyses use a three-way classification: pegged, intermediate (i.e., floating 
rates, but within a predetermined range), and floating.　Regimes can be classified according to 
either the publicly stated commitment of the central bank (a de jure classification) or the 
observed behavior of the exchange rate (a de facto classification).　Neither method is entirely 
satisfactory.　A country that claims to have a pegged exchange rate might in fact instigate fre-
quent changes in parity.　On the other hand, a country might experience very smal exchange 
rate movements, even though the central bank has no obligation to maintain a parity.　The 
approach usualy taken is to report results according to the stated intention of the central bank, 
but to supplement these results by categorizing the nonfloating regimes according to whether or 
not changes in parity were frequent.　The de jure classification uses the IMF’s Annual Report 
on Exchange Arangements and Exchange Restrictions, while the de facto classification is based 
on a survey of IMF desk oficers for each country.
The folowing classification system (ranked on the basis of the degree of flexibility of the 
arrangement) has been widely used in the literature: independent floating, managed floating, 
―　　―4
Floating Exchange Rate Regime: The Case of Mexico”, paper presented to a conference on “Interna-
tional Financial Markets: The Chalenge of Globalization” at Texas A and M University, 31 March; 
Pisani-Fery, Jean, and Benoit Coeure (1999), “The Exchange-Rate Regime Among Major Curenci-
es”, paper presented to the IMF Conference on Key Issues in Reform of the International Monetary 
and Financial System, Washington, May 28-29; Rose, Andrew (1996), “Exchange Rate Volatility, 
Monetary Policy, and Capital Mobility: Empirical Evidence on the Holy Trinity”, Journal of Inter-
national Money and Finance.
→
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crawling bands, crawling pegs, pegged within bands, fixed peg arrangements, currency board 
arangements, and exchange arangements with no separate legal tender (Frankel 1999, Edwards 
and Savastano 1999, IMF 1999).　Here we can extend this classification to clarify the degree 
of flexibility alowed by some of these regimes, thereby making it easier to compare the alterna-
tive regimes proposed by various authors.　First, a new “lightly managed float” regime is add-
ed, which involves only light interventions in the foreign exchange market to moderate 
excessive fluctuations.　The key diference between a “lightly managed float” and a “managed 
float” is that, in the later, the government has an idea where the exchange rate should be to 
maintain competitiveness and intervenes to keep the rate close to it.　In the former, the rate is 
essentialy determined in the market by demand and supply.　Second, the crawling band 
regime is divided into “crawling broad band” and “crawling narrow band” systems.　A broad 
band regime (say, about +/– 15 percent around the central parity) provides more flexibility and 
is closer to a floating system in terms of its merits and shortcomings.　A narrow band system 
(the Breton Woods system, and pre-1992 European Monetary System), on the other hand, can 
be put together with the other fixed exchange rate regimes.6)
The foreign exchange rate systems are ranked on the basis of the degree of flexibility of the 
exchange rate.　At one end of the spectrum is independent floating, a regime which provides 
maximum flexibility, alowing the exchange rate to be determined freely in the market by sup-
ply and demand.　Currency union/dolarization constitutes the other extreme where the 
exchange rate does not exist because the monetary autonomy is fuly surrendered and a shared 
currency or another country’s currency is used as the only legal tender.　The eight regimes 
between these extremes show decreasing flexibility as one moves from the floating regimes 
towards curency union/dolarization.　To simplify the presentation and beter structure the dis-
cussion, the ten regimes are arranged under the folowing four relatively homogeneous groups: 
(a) floating regimes (independent floating, lightly managed float); (b) Intermediate regimes 
(managed float, crawling broad band); (c) Soft peg regimes (crawling narrow band, crawling 
peg, pegged within bands, fixed peg); and (d) hard peg regimes (currency board, currency 
union/dolarization).
The post-war history of curency regimes is usualy divided into three periods:
―　　―5
 6) See Edwards, S. and. Savastano, M. A “Exchange Rate in Emerging Economies: What do we 
Know?　What do We Need to Know”, Working Paper 7228, NBER July 1999, and also See 
Frankel, J. A., “No single Curency Regime is Right for al Countries or at al Times”, NBER 1999.
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(a)　Pegged exchange rate regime (Second World War – June 1997)
This regime was first adopted after the Second World War.　The value of the baht was ini-
tialy either pegged to a major currency/gold or to a basket of currencies.　The basket regime 
was adopted from November 1984 until June 1997.　During this period, the Exchange Equali-
zation Fund (EEF) would announce and defend the baht value against the US dolar daily, 
whose monetary and financial measures were mainly designed to be in line with the pegged 
exchange rate regime.
(b)　Monetary targeting regime (1997–2000)
After the adoption of the floating exchange rate system in 1997, most South-East Asian 
countries received financial assistance from the IMF.　During implementation of the IMF 
program, monetary targeting regime was adopted.　Under this regime, the World Bank targeted 
the domestic money supply using a financial programming approach in order to ensure 
macroeconomic consistency as wel as to reach the ultimate objectives of sustainable growth 
and price stability.　The Bank set the daily and quarterly monetary base targets, on which 
its daily liquidity management was based.　Daily liquidity management was essentialy 
aimed at avoiding excessive volatility in interest rates and ensuring liquidity in the financial 
system.
(c)　Inflation targeting regime (May 1997- present)
After the IMF program was introduced central banks made an extensive reappraisal of both 
the domestic and the external environment and concluded that the targeting of money supply is 
going to be less efective than the targeting of inflation.　The main cause for change was that 
the relationship between money supply and output growth was becoming less stable, especialy 
in the period after the major crisis and the uncertainty in credit extensions as wel as the rapidly 
changing financial sector.
3.　Foregn Exchange Rate systems in South East and North East Asia
Macroeconomic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes have been a 
subject of continuing research and controversy.　Using a three-way classification (pegged, inter-
mediate, and floating rates), an earlier study (Ghosh and others, 1996) which included 136 coun-
tries for the period 1960-89, analyzed the link between exchange rate regimes, inflation and 
―　　―6
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growth7).　A strong result of the study is that pegged exchange rates are associated with lower 
inflation and less variability.　The authors argued that this was due to a discipline efect — the 
political costs of failure of defending the peg induce disciplined monetary and fiscal policy — 
and a confidence efect — to the extent that the peg is credible, there is a stronger readiness to 
hold domestic currency, which reduces the inflationary consequences of a given expansion in 
money supply.　The study also found that pegged rates are associated with higher investment 
but correlated with slower productivity growth.　On net, output growth is slightly lower under 
pegged exchange rates compared to floating and intermediate regimes.　In addition, the vari-
ability of growth and employment is greater under the pegged regimes.8)
A number of methodological weakness of these studies have been pointed out (Edwards 
and Savastano, 1998; Mussa and others, 2000).9)　First, they do not control for the country cir-
cumstances (degree of capital mobility, size, degree of integration, and macroeconomic policies).　
For instance, in some countries, the corelation between inflation and the exchange rate was due 
to fiscal indiscipline rather than to an exogenous decision to adopt a flexible exchange rate.　
Second, classification of the exchange rate regimes used in these studies is the oficial one 
reported by the countries (de jure) rather than the actual (de facto) regime.　As noted earlier, 
discrepancies between the two are often substantial.　Third, these studies implicitly assume that 
al exchange rate regimes in their sample were sustainable (that is, consistent with mac-
roeconomic policies) and that al changes in regimes were voluntary.　The fourth weakness is 
related to reverse causality.　These studies do not address the issue whether fixed exchange 
rates deliver low inflation by adding discipline and credibility to the conduct of macroeconomic 
policies, or is it that countries with low inflation choose pegged exchange rates to indicate their 
―　　―7
 7) See Ghosh, A. R., Gulde, A. M., Ostry, J. D. and Wolf, H. (1996): “Does the Exchange Rate 
Regime Mater for Inflation and Growth”; IMF Economic Issues 2, 1996.
 8) A more recent IMF study that extends the period of analysis to the mid-1990s reports similar find-
ings (IMF 1997).　However, in an analysis of the recent experience with increasing capital market 
integration and the replacement of fixed exchange rates in the 1990s, Caramaza and Aziz (1998) 
found that the diferences in inflation and output growth between fixed and flexible regimes are no 
longer significant.
 9) See Sebastian Edwards & Savastano, Miguel A. (1998): “The Morning After: The Mexican Peso in 
the Aftermath of the 1994 Curency Crisis”; NBER Working Papers 6516, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc.
 See Mussa, M., Masson, P., Swoboda, A., Jadresic, E., Mauro, P. and Berg, A. (2000): 
“Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy”; IMF Occasional Paper 
193, 2000.
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intention to maintain their anti-inflationary stance.10)
Al ASEAN South-East and the developed North-East Asian countries use a form of a man-
aged floating exchange rate system with certain modifications.　The old fixed-rate exchange 
systems were abandoned and the floating system was seen as reflecting market forces rather 
than the artificial defence of a currency by the government.　A country that did not need to 
intervene to support its currency would not need to maintain huge foreign-exchange reserves.　
On the other hand, the post-IMF foreign exchange arangements are modified again.　After the 
Asian crisis al Asian economies gave ways to anti-inflationary monetary discipline.　Some aca-
demics started to argue that the floating-system had caused al the world’s ils, and that, in any 
case, few curencies were free floating.11)　Most Asian countries had a ‘dirty’ managed floating 
system; i.e., they intervened when they felt that the currency was below or above the monetary 
target.　On the other hand, in al Asian countries international reserves had increased not 
decreased contrary to the academic expectations.　The inflation rates seemed to be significantly 
higher than under the fixed system.　Currencies became determined not by the fundamental 
forces of purchasing power parity but by the speculation and arbitrage of the international 
money market.　The other feature of this region was that international trade became over-
whelmed by international flows of funds as a determinant of exchange rates.　On the other 
hand, countered some proponents of freely floating exchange rates, if governments know beter 
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10) Using data from 159 countries for the 1974–99 period, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) reclas-
sified the exchange rates into three groups (float, intermediate, fixed) and estimated the correlation 
between the actual (de facto) exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic performance.　The main 
findings include: (a) fixed exchange rate regimes seem to have no significant impact on the inflation 
level when compared with pure floats, while intermediate regimes are the clear under-performers; 
(b) pegs are significantly and negatively correlated with per capita output growth in non-industrial 
countries; (c) output volatility declines monotonicaly with the degree of regime flexibility; and (d) 
real interest rates appear to be lower under fixed rates than under floating rates because of the lower 
uncertainty associated with fixed rates.　See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger “Classifying Exchange 
Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. Words”, UTDT
11) Ethier, Wilfred, and Bloomfield, Arthur I. (1975), “Managing the Managed Float”, Princeton 
Essays in International Finance no. 112; Goodhart, Charles, and Delargy, P.J.R. (1998), “Financial 
Crises: Plus ca Change, plus c’est la Meme Chose”, International Finance 1(2), 261–87; Fratzscher, 
Marcel (1998), “The Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes and Stability on Macroeconomic 
Performance: An Empirical Analysis”, mimeo; McKinnon, Ronald I. (2000), “After the Crisis, the 
East Asian Dolar Standard Resurrected: An Interpretation of High-Frequency Exchange-Rate 
Pegging”, paper presented to a conference of the ASEAN Economic Associations in Singapore on 
7–8 September; Ortiz, Guilermo, and Agustin Carstens (2000), “The Experience with a Floating 
Exchange Rate Regime: The Case of Mexico”, paper presented to a conference on “International 
Financial Markets: The Chalenge of Globalization” at Texas A and M University, 31 March.
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than the market where an exchange rate belongs, then they should, on average, be able to make 
a profit by buying when currency is undervaluated and seling when currency is overvaluated.　
Yet the evidence demonstrated the opposite: central-bank intervention seemed to be mistimed, 
losing more often than Malaysia, Thailand 1997, Taiwan 1998, Malaysia 1998, Singapore 1999.　
In Appendix 1 we present the more important systematic and institutional foreign exchange 
developments in Asian countries.
In Thailand under the managed float system, the value of the baht is determined by market 
forces.　The reference rate for interbank spot transactions is a volume-weighted average of 
interbank spot rates on the previous trading day.　The reference rate for commercial banks’ 
counter transactions is a simple average of the submited rates across al commercial banks on 
the previous trading day.　Foreign exchange counter rates consist of the buying and seling 
rates for 27 curencies.12)
Some countries, for example Taiwan, have a floating exchange rate system in which bank-
ers set rates independently of the authorities.　The Taiwan authorities, however, control the 
largest banks authorized to deal in foreign exchange.　Fourteen foreign banks are engaged in 
foreign exchange business.　The number of private domestic banks permited to deal in foreign 
exchange is steadily increasing.13)
In Indonesia the government has maintained the convertibility of the rupiah since the 
1960’s.　There have been no foreign exchange controls since 1972.　The government folows 
a managed float based on a basket of major trading currencies, including the dolar.　Current 
policy is to maintain the competitiveness of the rupiah through a gradual depreciation against 
the dolar, at a rate of about 5% a year.　Since 21 June 1973, Malaysia has adopted the flexible 
exchange rate regime.　Bank Negara Malaysia exercises the option to intervene when deemed 
necessary in order to even out sharp exchange rate fluctuations.
―　　―9
12) For example in Thailand, the central bank announced the adoption of inflation targeting in May 
2000.　The central bank decided to launch inflation targeting under the existing legal framework, 
whereby the Monetary Policy Board (MPB) was first appointed on 5 April 2000 and vested with 
the power to decide monetary policy by the Governor.　The Board, with 9 members, comprised dis-
tinguished external experts and the top management of the central bank.　The MPB had the author-
ity to set the direction of monetary policy with price stability as the overiding objective, and also to 
refine the inflation targeting framework to suit the Thai economy.
13) Taiwan’s Central Bank of China (CBC) intervenes in the foreign exchange market when it feels that 
speculation or “drastic fluctuations” in the exchange rate may impair normal market adjustments.　
Two tools the CBC uses to influence the foreign exchange market are restrictions on banks’ over-
bought and oversold positions and limits on banks’ foreign liabilities.　The CBC also limits the use 
of derivative products denominated in New Taiwan dolars.
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Since mid-July 1997, Bank Negara had alowed the ringgit to be determined by market 
forces, but started intervening again in early January 1998 in order to stop market panic, folow-
ing the free fal of the rupiah.　In money market interventions, the central bank has had to exer-
cise great care to ensure that the timing of the interventions is just right, which is not always 
easy to achieve.
Korea’s case is particularly important for other South-East Asian economies.　Korea’s 
exchange rate system is a free-floating system.　A total of 29 exchange rates of the Korean 
Won against other currencies are disseminated now, involving the U.S.　Dolar, Japanese Yen, 
Euro (and its member countries’ curencies), British Pound, Singapore Dolar, Thai Bhat, and so 
on.　Exchange rates of the Korean Won against the U.S.　Dolar are obtained from actual for-
eign exchange transactions between foreign exchange banks through foreign exchange broker 
companies.　Exchange rates of the Korean won against other curencies are automaticaly deter-
mined in relation to the exchange rate of the U.S.　Dolar against these curencies in the interna-
tional foreign exchange market.　The Bank of Korea disseminates the exchange rate data as a 
service to the public, but the data are originaly provided by foreign exchange broker companies.
In the 1980s, the exchange rate determination in Korea had been greatly influenced by gov-
ernment discretion.　In a smal open economy, which relies heavily on international trade for 
its growth, the current account is a major control variable used by the government to maintain 
macroeconomic stability.　Korea was no exception to this stylized fact.　As such, the Korean 
government had frequently intervened in the foreign exchange market to atain a desired level of 
the current account balance.　The real efective exchange rate is a trade weighted average of 
real exchange rates of Korea’s major trading partners and has been considered as a useful 
indicator for a country’s price competitiveness in the global market.　If the real effective 
exchange rate fals, it implies that the Korean won depreciates against the currencies of major 
trading partners, thereby increasing the price competitiveness of Korean products in the world 
market.
The fact that government discretion has disappeared in the 1990s is mainly atributable to 
the introduction of the Market Average Exchange Rate System in March 1990.　Unlike other 
past exchange rate systems, this system, to a substantial degree, left the exchange rate to be 
determined by market forces.　Consequently, it has contributed significantly to the eficient 
functioning of the foreign exchange market.　Nevertheless, it failed to remove al the market 
ineficiency as it stil limited daily exchange rate fluctuations.　In fact, the daily exchange rate 
band maintained until December 15, 1997 has provided a room for the exchange rate to be per-
―　　―10
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sistently misaligned, particularly in the later periods of the 1990s.14)
Trade-related funds flow freely into and out of Taiwan.　Although Taiwan relaxed some 
restrictions on capital account transactions in 1995, most notably restrictions on portfolio invest-
ments, it stil maintains a range of controls on inward and outward capital flows that limit 
demand for the New Taiwan Dolar and reduce upward pressures on its value.
The daily exchange rate band under the Market Average Exchange Rate System assumed a 
similar role in Korea by making the exchange rate movements stable.　Although the stable 
exchange rate movements play a positive role in atracting foreign capital, capital inflows tend 
to put upward pressures on the real value of the domestic curency.　This has indeed happened 
in Korea.　The continuing increase in capital inflow in the 1990s was accompanied by persis-
tent real appreciation of the Korean won as the real exchange rate continued to decline over 
time.　In retrospect, the pressures for future depreciation of the nominal won/dolar exchange 
rate appear to have built up as late as 1996.　The growth rate of Korean exports declined 
dramaticaly from 31.5% in 1995 to 4.1% in 1996.　The market may have interpreted this 
decline in exports as a signal that the current account deficit of 4.8% in GDP would not be 
sustainable.　Similarly, the external liability to exports almost doubled to 125.3% in 1996 from 
63.6% in 1995.15)
4.　Macroeconomic benefits and disadvantages of foreign exchange rate 
systems
4.1　Operational currency systems in world economy
The experiences with implementation of the exchange rate systems may suggest some gen-
eralizations about the conditions under which various regimes would function reasonably wel 
— though there are many exceptions.　The floating systems, it was suggested, would be an 
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14) The daily exchange rate band under the Market Average Exchange Rate System assumed a similar 
role in Korea by making the exchange rate movements stable.　Although the stable exchange rate 
movements play a positive role in atracting foreign capital, capital inflows tend to put upward pres-
sures on the real value of the domestic currency.　This has indeed happened in Korea.　The con-
tinuing increase in capital inflow in the 1990s was accompanied by persistent real appreciation of 
the Korean won as the real exchange rate continued to decline over time.　In retrospect, the pres-
sures for future depreciation of the nominal won/dolar exchange rate appear to have built up as late 
as in 1996.　The growth rate of Korean exports declined dramaticaly from 31.5% in 1995 to 4.1% 
in 1996.　The market may have interpreted this decline in exports as a signal that the current 
account deficit of 4.8% in GDP would not be sustainable.　Similarly, the external liability to 
exports almost doubled to 125.3% in 1996 from 63.6% in 1995.
15) See Macrostatistics for Korea.　Ministry of Finance Data, 2001.
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appropriate choice for medium and large industrialized countries and some emerging market 
economies that have import and export sectors that are relatively smal compared to GDP, but 
are fuly integrated into the global capital markets and have diversified production and trade, a 
deep and broad financial sector, and strong prudential standards.　On the other hand, the hard 
peg system seems to be more appropriate for countries satisfying the optimum currency area 
criteria (countries in the European Economic and Monetary Union), smal countries already inte-
grated into a larger neighboring country (dolarization in Panama), or countries with a history of 
monetary disorder, high inflation, and low credibility of policymakers to maintain stability and 
that need a strong anchor for monetary stabilization (curency board in Argentina and Bulgaria). 
Possibly, the soft peg regimes would be best for countries with limited links to international 
capital markets, less diversified production and exports, and shalow financial markets, as wel 
as countries stabilizing from high and protracted inflation under an exchange rate-based stabili-
zation program (Turkey).　These are largely but not exclusively non- emerging market develop-
ing countries.　The intermediate regimes, a middle road between floating rates and soft pegs, 
aim to incorporate the benefits of floating and pegged regimes while avoiding their 
shortcomings.　They are beter suited for emerging market economies and some other develop-
ing countries with relatively stronger financial sector and track record for disciplined mac-
roeconomic policy.16)
4.2　Advantages and Disadvantages of Forex systems
As indicated earlier in this study, al exchange rate regimes ofer difering benefits as wel 
as costs (see Table 1).
The main advantages of the floating regimes are their relative invulnerability to currency 
crisis, and their ability to absorb adverse shocks and pursue an independent monetary policy.　
These advantages come with the cost of high short-term exchange rate volatility and large 
medium-term swings characterized by misalignment.　At the other end of the spectrum, the 
hard peg regimes provide maximum stability and credibility for monetary policy, and low trans-
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16) Dolarization is a generic name used to mean the replacement of a national currency by a foreign 
curency as legal tender, which would refer not only to the use of the dolar, but also for instance to 
the use of the rand, franc, etc.　A notable exception is Denmark which is in the Europe’s Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) and is thus pegging within a band.　Mussa, M., Masson, Swoboda, P., Jad-
resic, A. E., Mauro, P. and Berg, A. “Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World 
Economy”, IMF Occasional Paper 193, 2000.　McKinnon, R. I., “Euroland and Asia in a Dolar-
Based International Monetary System: Mundel Revisited”, 1999.
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action costs and interest rates, but sufer from the loss of lender of last resort role of the central 
bank and seigniorage revenue.　Two big advantages of the soft peg regimes are that they main-
tain stability and reduce transaction costs and the exchange rate risk while providing a nominal 
anchor for monetary policy.　These advantages have been undermined by a substantial increase 
in global capital mobility in the 1990s.　The soft peg regimes, in countries open to interna-
tional capital flows, are inherently vulnerable to currency crises.　By giving up some nominal 
stability for greater flexibility, the intermediate regimes aim to get the best of both worlds: to 
provide a limited nominal anchor for inflationary expectations, but also avoid volatility and 
overvaluation, and reduce the risk of currency crisis by restoring the two-way bet for specula-
tors with broad soft bands.　An important consensus on the choice of exchange rate regimes is 
that no single exchange rate regime is best for al countries or at al times (Frankel 1999, Mussa 
and others 2000, ibidem).　The choice would vary depending on the specific country circum-
stances at the time period in question (the size and openness of the country to trade and finan-
cial flows, structure of its production and exports, stage of its financial development, its 
inflationary history, and the nature and source of potential shocks it faces), and the country’s 
policy objectives which would involve trade-ofs.　The ultimate choice would be determined 
by the relative weights given to these factors.　In selecting the optimum degree of flexibility 
macroeconomic policy makers usualy place higher weights on things that would minimize 
short term socio-economic costs.17)
In floating regimes, the real and nominal exchange rates are endogenous variables deter-
mined in the market by demand and supply.　The government and the monetary authority do 
―　　―13
17) Frankel, J. A., “No single Curency Regime is Right for al Countries or at al Times”, NBER 1999.　
Frankel, J., E. Fajnzylber, S. Schmukler, and L. Serven, “Verifying Exchange Rate Regimes”, May 
2000; Mussa, M., P. Masson, A. Swoboda, E. Jadresic, P. Mauro, and A. Berg, “Exchange Rate 
Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy”, IMF Occasional Paper 193, 2000.
Table 1　Main Trade-Ofs When Selecting an Exchange Rate System in an Open Economy
Hard PegSoft PegIntermediateFloating
+ ++ ++ –– –Stability
+ ++ –+ ++ –Misalignment
+ +– –+ ++ –Vulnerability to Crisis
– –– –+ –+ +Vulnerability to Shocks
– –– –+ –+ +Independence of Monetary Policy
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not determine what the rate should be and do not make any efort to guide the rate towards a 
desired level or zone.　Episodic and ad hoc interventions in a lightly managed regime are in the 
spirit of “leaning against the wind”.　They aim to slow the exchange rate movements and 
dampen excessive fluctuations, and are not intended to defend any particular rate or zone.
In contrast, in al other regimes (with the exception of a curency union/dolarization where 
the national currency is given up altogether), the government needs to have an idea where the 
real exchange rate should be to ensure that the national economy is competitive.　Typicaly, the 
long-run equilibrium real exchange rate is estimated based on the economic fundamentals of the 
country, and a variety of policy and institutional arrangements are made to keep the actual rate 
suficiently close to it over the medium-term.18)
The classification of foreign exchange rate systems is presented in Table 2.　This is the 
functional breakdown of the systems according to the methodology proposed by Stanley Fisher 
of the IMF.
While the independently floating was the main feature of the developed market economies 
(including Japan), the emerging developing economies display a more structured patern (see 
Table 3).
The picture becomes clearer if we group these economies into appropriate categories (see 
Table 4 and 5).
According to Table 4, the most common system seems to be independent floating (13 
economies), then other conventional fixed pegs (7 economies), crawling bands exchange rates 
(5 economies), and curency boards (3 economies).
The “rest of the world” displayed a significantly diferent patern (see Table 5).　Here the 
curency board and other arangements without a seperate legal tender predominate.　The fixed 
pegs folow and the managed float is much less practiced.　Independent floating is used by less 
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18) Active management of the exchange rate under these regimes can provide a developing country 
with an additional strong policy tool to correct misalignment and to influence the balance of pay-
ments, trade flows, investment, and production.　The earlier debate about exchange rate regimes 
was largely about their influence on monetary discipline and credibility, and the trade-of between 
flexibility and credibility.　Floating regimes provide maximum discretion for monetary policy, but 
discretion comes with the problem of time-inconsistency.　That is, if a government tends to misuse 
its discretion and cannot keep its promise of low inflation today, it wil be dificult to get people to 
believe its future policy announcements.　Therefore, restraints need to be put on government to 
ensure that discretion is not misused and economic polices are consistent and sustainable and that 
there is not going to be inflation. (See for example P. Krugman remarks of open market economies, 
ibidem)
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than 20% of al countries under review.
It was generaly agreed that floating regimes would have an inflationary bias, and that the 
degree of discipline and credibility would increase with a decline of flexibility.　The main argu-
ment in favor of fixed rates was their ability to induce discipline and make the monetary policy 
more credible because adoption of lax monetary (and fiscal) policy would eventualy lead to an 
exhaustion of reserves and colapse of the fixed exchange rate system implying a big political 
cost for the policy makers.　The nature of debate has changed significantly with the steady 
increase in international capital flows.　Soft peg regimes in a number of emerging market 
economies open to global financial markets have colapsed in the 1990s.　Dificulty in main-
taining credibility under soft pegs when the capital account is open is a key factor that brought 
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Table 2　Forex Systems in Developed Market Economies (pre-Euro)
Exchange
Arangement
Other Area
countries
Exchange
Arangement
Euro Area
countries
IFAustraliaNSAustria
IFCanadaNSBelgium
HBDenmarkNSFinland
CBAHong KongNSFrance
IFJapanNSGermany
IFNew ZealandNSIreland
MFNorwayNSItaly
MFSingaporeNSNetherlands
IFSwedenNSPortugal
IFSwitzerlandNSSpain
IFUnited StatesIFUnited Kingdom
Note: Economies listed in the MSCI Developed Markets index.
Key:
NS = Arangements with no separate legal tender
CBA = Curency board
FP = Other conventional fixed pegs
HB = Pegged rate in horizontal band
CP = Crawling peg
CB = Rates within crawling bands
MF = Managed float with no pre-announced exchange rate path
IF = Independently floating
Source: IMF, Annual Report 2000
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Table 3　Forex systems in Emerging Market Economies
Exchange
Arangemen
Latin
America
Exchange
Arangemen
Europe &
Middle East
Exchange
Arangemen
Asia
Exchange
Arangemen
Africa
CBAArgentinaCBABulgariaFPChinaFPMorocco
IFBrazilMFCzech RepubliIFIndiaMFNigeria
IFChileFPEgyptIFIndonesiaIFSouth Africa
IFColombiaHBGreeceIFKorea
IF/NSEcuadorCBHungaryFPMalaysia
IFMexicoCBIsraelFPPakistan
NSPanamaFPJordanIFPhilippines
IFPeruCBPolandCBSri Lanka
CBVenezuelaFPQatarMFTaiwan
IFRussiaIFThailand
CPTurkey
Note: Economies listed either and/or in the MSCI Emerging Markets and EMBI + indices.
Key: Every key is the same as in the Table 2.
Source: IMF, Annual Report 2000
Table 4 Forex Systems in Emerging Market Countries Grouped by Exchange Rate Arrange-
ment (2001)
Countries
Exchange Rate
Regime
*Argentina, *Bulgaria, *PanamaNS/CBA (3) (*3)
*China, Egypt, Jordan, *Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, QatarFP (7) (*2)
*GreeceHB (1) (*1)
TurkeyCP (1)
Hungary, *Israel, Poland, Sri Lanka, *VenezuelaCB (5) (*2)
Czech Republic, Nigeria, *Taiwan POCMF (3) (*1)
*Brazil, *Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, *India, Indonesia, *Korea, *Mexico, Peru, 
*Philippines, Russia, *South
IF (13) (*7)
Note: * indicates country whose weight in either the EMBI+ or MSCI index is 2% or greater.　
Numbers in parenthesis indicate number of countries in each group; asterisked numbers are self-
explanatory.
Key: Every key is the same as in the Table 2.
Source: IMF, Annual Report 2000
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these pegs down.　To achieve credibility quickly, some authors argued that these countries 
need to move either to hard pegs or floating rates.
4.3　Balance between exchange rate stability and flexibility
Institutionaly binding monetary arangements under hard pegs tie a government’s hands to 
provide irreversible fixed rates and maintain maximum credibility.　The long-run equilibrium 
real exchange rate is the real rate that, for given values of “economic fundamentals” (openness, 
productivity diferentials, terms of trade, public expenditure, direct foreign investment, interna-
tional interest rates, etc.) is compatible with the simultaneous achievement of internal and exter-
nal equilibria.
The other way to solve the credibility problem is to float the curency: that is, not make any 
promises about the exchange rate at al.　The floating regimes may exhibit high short-term 
exchange rate volatility and medium- term swings that are only weakly related to economic 
fundamentals.　This is largely explained by the fact that the exchange rate is also an asset price 
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Table 5　Forex Systems in Al Other Countries Grouped by Exchange Rate Arrange-
ments, 2001
Countries
Exchange Rate
Regime
Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Congo (Rep. of), Côte 
d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica,
NS/CBA (31)
Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, 
Cape Verde, Comoros, El Salvador, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Macedonia
FP (38)
Cyprus, Iceland, Libya, VietnamHB (4)
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, TunisiaCP (4)
Honduras, UruguayCB (2)
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Dominican Rep., 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Paraguay,
MF (23)
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Eritrea, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mau-
ritius, Moldova,
IF (29)
Key: Every key is the same as in the Table 2.
Source: IMF, Annual Report 2000
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influenced strongly by short-term financial flows which are subject to speculation, manias, pan-
ics, herding, and contagion.　As capital market integration deepens, capital market transactions 
increasingly dominate changes in exchange rates.　Determined in this manner, exchange rates 
may develop their own short-term and medium-term dynamics that overwhelm the goods and 
services market transactions.　Volatility is substantialy higher in developing countries with 
thin foreign exchange markets usualy dominated by a relatively smal number of market partici-
pants, and may be compounded by a lack of political stability and disciplined macroeconomic 
environment.
In a world with high capital mobility, even smal adjustments in international portfolio alo-
cations to developing economies can result in large swings in capital flows creating large volatil-
ity in exchange rates.　Because their financial markets are poorly developed, hedging 
possibilities are limited in developing countries.　High exchange rate volatility creates uncer-
tainty, increases transaction costs and interest rates, discourages international trade and invest-
ment, and fuels inflation.　The medium-term swings are identified with substantial 
misalignment.　This is a particularly serious concern for developing countries because persis-
tent real exchange rate volatility and misalignment have been associated with unsustainable 
trade deficits, and lower economic growth over the medium and long run (Ghura and Grennes 
1993, Razin and Colins 1997, Elbadawi 1998, World Bank 2000).19)
Persistent overvaluation is usualy identified as a strong early warning for currency crisis 
(Kaminsky and others 1998).　It is also recognized that, with high volatility in exchange rate, 
it is very hard to develop long-term domestic financial markets.　The degree of volatility of the 
nominal exchange rate decreases as one moves along the exchange rate spectrum towards 
decreasing flexibility.　The hard peg regimes with their strong and credible institutional 
arangements guarantee nominal exchange rate stability.　Under a curency board arangement, 
successfuly aligning the exchange rate to a large and stable country minimizes exchange rate 
risk, and encourages international trade and investment.　If country circumstances alow it, 
going one step further and actualy adopting the neighbor’s curency as one’s own, would elimi-
nate transactions cost as wel promoting further trade and investment.　The soft peg regimes 
can maintain stable and competitive exchange rates only if the authorities set the rate at a 
―　　―18
19) World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries”, Washington DC, 2000.　
27; Ghura, D. and Grennes, T. “The Real Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Performance in Sub-
 Saharan Africa”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 42: 155–174, October 1993; Elbadawi, 
I., “Real Exchange Rate Policy and Non-Traditional Exports in Developing Countries”, WIDER, 
The UN University, Helsinki.
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sustainable level consistent with the economic fundamentals and convince the markets with dis-
ciplined macroeconomic policies and credible institutions of their ability to keep it there.　How-
ever, they can not guarantee an absence of misalignment, particularly in countries open to 
international capital flows.　As shown so many times in the past, lack of monetary and fiscal 
discipline, inappropriate financial policies, and real external and domestic shocks can lead to 
misalignments and devastating curency crises under the soft peg regimes.20)
The intermediate regimes provide scope for seting an appropriate balance between 
exchange rate stability and flexibility.　If supported by sound macroeconomic policies, they 
can keep the variations in the exchange rate within reasonable bounds, dampening the degree of 
uncertainty while permiting enough flexibility to adjust the parity (the center of the band) to 
economic fundamentals.　They are therefore less susceptible to volatility and misalignment 
than soft peg and floating regimes if the authorities are not commited to defending the edges of 
the band and, when the need arises, alow the exchange rate to go outside the edges.
High volatility of the exchange rate in the floating regimes gives rise to a phenomenon 
caled “fear of floating”.　According to recent studies, few developing countries that claim to 
be implementing a floating exchange rate policy, do in fact alow their exchange rate to float 
(Calvo and Reinhart 2000).　Compared to the United States and Japan, international reserves, 
reserve money, and interest rates in these countries have been more volatile, and their exchange 
rates more stable, which indicate that they effectively maintain some kind of managed or 
pegged regime.　“Fear of floating” is explained largely by the fact that exchange rate volatility 
is more damaging to trade, and the pass-through from exchange rate swings to inflation is far 
higher in developing countries.　Fear of appreciating because of short-term capital inflows and 
losing competitiveness is also a factor for not leting the exchange rate float freely.　A key 
problem of fearful floating is its lack of transparency and verifiability which heights 
uncertainty.21)
Floating its exchange rate permits a country to use its monetary policy (and other mac-
roeconomic policies) to steer the domestic economy because monetary policy does not have to 
be subordinated to the needs of defending the exchange rate.　Given that cyclical conditions 
difer significantly among countries, the ability of a country to run an independent monetary pol-
―　　―19
20) Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., and Reinhart, C. “Leading Indicators of Currency Crisis”, IMF Staf 
Papers, Vol 45, No. 1: 1–48, March 1998.
21) See Calvo, G. A. and Reinhart, C. M. “Fear of Floating”, 2000a.　Calvo, G. A. andReinhart, C. M. 
“Fixing for Your Life”, 2000b.
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icy adapted to local conditions is very important, particularly in industrialized countries where 
monetary policy is the main policy instrument for macroeconomic management.　Under float-
ing regimes, a nominal anchor is needed to guide monetary policy.　A widely used anchor is a 
clearly articulated monetary rule such as to achieve a target growth rate for some monetary 
aggregates (reserve money, M1, M2, etc.).
An alternative anchor, increasingly adopted in the period of 1990–2005 is a publicly 
announced medium-term target for inflation.　Under both arrangements, the anchor becomes 
the intermediate target for monetary policy to which the monetary authority commits itself to 
achieve.　Independence of the monetary authority and strong institutional commitment are criti-
cal requirements for both options to be efectively implemented.　However, these conditions 
hardly exist in most developing countries.　The degree of monetary policy discretion is very 
limited in the soft peg regimes because monetary policy is reserved almost exclusively to 
defend the peg to ensure credibility.　The monetary authority stands ready to buy and sel 
foreign exchange to maintain the pre-announced rate or band.　This commitment provides a 
clear and easily monitored nominal anchor for monetary policy particularly in countries trying 
to stabilize after a period of high inflation.
Experience has shown that reducing high inflation with a traditional money-based stabiliza-
tion can be maintained for a short period only.　The lender of last resort role of the central 
bank exists in a soft peg regime, but it could be inconsistent with the nominal peg in a country 
open to international capital flows.　The loss of confidence folowing a liquidity crisis could 
start a currency crisis, and the new liquidity created by the central bank would support the run 
on international reserves; the central bank would efectively finance the run on the banks by 
pumping in credit only to repurchase the liquidity in seling foreign exchange (Indonesia in 
1998, Thailand in 1997, Turkey in 2000).　Among emerging market economies five countries 
have adopted inflation targeting: Brazil, Czech Republic, Israel, Poland, and South Africa.
By dampening and guiding price expectations, a fixed exchange rate alows a quicker con-
trol on inflation without excessive contraction of aggregate demand.　In fact, there are few 
instances in which a successful disinflation from triple digit inflation has taken place without 
the use of an exchange rate anchor.　The main disadvantage of a fixed exchange rate regime as 
a nominal anchor is that the link between the parity and the fundamentals may be broken, which 
would lead to overvaluation, currency crisis, and eventualy abandonment of the stabilization 
program.
An exchange rate based a disinflation program should include a smooth exit strategy from 
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its pegged arangement once prices are adequately stabilized.　Introducing and gradualy widen-
ing a band when stabilization gains credibility and the curency is strong would be an appropri-
ate exit strategy (Debele and others 1998, Eichengreen and others 1998).　In hard peg regimes 
monetary autonomy is either fuly surrendered to another country (currency union or dolariza-
tion), or monetary policy is tied to rigid rules under legislation (curency board).　The ability of 
the monetary authority to act as lender of last resort in the face of system-wide liquidity 
crunches is very limited.22)
Therefore, the hard peg regimes are more prone to bank runs and financial panics than coun-
tries with ful-fledged central banks.　This inability can be compensated for by creation of a 
banking sector stabilization fund as has been done in Bulgaria or contingent international credit 
line such as Argentina’s repo facility to help buffer potential financial sector problems.　
Another weakness of the hard peg regimes, particularly dolarization, is the loss of seigniorage 
which may amount to 2–3% of GDP in developing countries.　This may be ofset by political 
arrangements for transferring seigniorage from the anchor country to the dolarizing country.　
Such arangements are in place in the Rand area.23)
The intermediate regimes impose some constraints on monetary policy with the degree of 
policy independence being determined by the width of the band.　In a crawling band regime, 
the parity that is pre-announced acts as a nominal anchor only in an atenuated way; it compels 
the correction of excess short-run monetary emission, but the endogeneity of the crawl in the 
longer run may not suficiently pin down the price level.　Therefore, a stronger nominal anchor 
may be needed to guide the monetary policy in the longer-term.
A key merit of floating regimes is that they help deflect or absorb the impact of adverse 
external and domestic shocks (deterioration in terms of trade, increases in the international inter-
est rate, reversals of capital flows, contraction in world demand, natural disasters), and avoid 
large costs to the real economy.　These shocks usualy necessitate an adjustment in the real 
exchange rate.　Because domestic prices move slowly, it is both faster and less costly to have 
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22) Eichengreen B., “International Monetary Arrangements for the 21 st Century, Brookings Institu-
tions”, 1994; also Crocket, A. “Monetary Implications of Increased Capital Flows”.　In Changing 
Capital Markets: Implications for Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, 1994.　Debele, G., 
Masson, P., Savastano, M. and Sharma, S. “Inflation Targeting as a Framework of Monetary Poli-
cy”, IMF Economic Issues 15, 1998.
23) For the detailed data on Rand area see the IMF paper (ibidem). Also, Eichengreen, B, P. Masson, 
H. Bredenkamp, B. Johnston, J. Haman, E. Jadresic, and I. Otker, “Exit Strategies: Policy Options 
for Countries Seeking Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility”, IMF Occasional Paper 168, 1998.
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the nominal exchange rate respond to a shock.　Strong wage indexation may increase the 
degree of pass-through from exchange rate to prices and limit the shock bufering capacity of 
the floating regimes.
The shock absorption capacity of the pegged regimes, particularly the hard peg regimes, is 
very limited.　Given the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the shocks are largely absorbed by 
changes in economic activity and employment which may be a painful and protracted process.　
Wage and price flexibility, and factor mobility are therefore essential in these regimes to moder-
ate the impact of adverse shocks.　Because monetary policy subordinates the need of maintain-
ing the peg in these regimes, the fiscal policy must be flexible enough to mitigate the impact of 
the shocks.　The intermediate regimes provide some exchange rate flexibility to help deflect or 
absorb an important part of the shocks.　The shock absorption capacity of the regime would 
depend on the width of the band.
The degree of economic integration among countries has important implications for the 
exchange rate regime they choose.　Countries that are highly integrated with each other with 
respect to trade and other economic and political relations, and have high labor mobility, sym-
metric shocks, and high income correlation are likely to constitute an optimum currency area 
(OCA).　It is beneficial for these countries to establish regional cooperation on exchange rate 
policy.　Because integration substantialy reduces the benefits of their own monetary policy, 
smal countries are beter of pegging their curencies to a large neighbor’s or adopt a neighbor’s 
currency as their own.　These arrangements would reduce transaction costs and interest rates, 
eliminate exchange risks, and encourage further integration and growth.　In countries satisfying 
OCA conditions, but where a regional common curency is not politicaly feasible, for example 
in East Asia, McKinnon (ibidem, 1999) advises establishing eficient common monetary rules 
to stabilize their exchange rates to avoid competitive devaluation under a common dolar peg.24)
The second approach is to create a regional currency union.　This is a more ambitious 
approach because it may involve giving up national currencies and building regional monetary 
institutions and macroeconomic coordination.　The largest currency union is EMU.　Other 
examples include CFA franc zone, the East Caribbean dolar area, and the Common Monetary 
Area.　The CFA franc zone consists of two separate monetary unions of sub-Saharan African 
countries and the Comoros.
A third approach is common links to an outside currency or a basket of currencies as the 
―　　―22
24) McKinnon, R. I., “Euroland and Asia in a Dolar-Based International Monetary System: Mundel 
Revisited”, 1999.
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monetary standard for the regional group.　This approach avoids the need to create complex 
intra-regional institutions such as a central bank, but requires very close policy coordination 
among the members of the group.　This may be an option in the longer term for ASEAN 
countries.　For these groups a curency union does not seem to be feasible at this time because 
intra-regional trade links, while important, are weaker than in Europe, and countries in these 
groups seem to be subject to much greater asymmetry of shocks.
4.4 Macroeconomic Policy Objectives and the choice of foreign exchange rate system — A 
Reevaluation
Considerations afecting the choice of an exchange rate regime may change over time.　As 
country’s circumstances and international environment change, so does the exchange rate 
regime appropriate for the country.　When a country has a long history of high inflation, for 
example, a pegged exchange rate may be the best option for the country to guide expectations 
and reduce inflation quickly and without excessive cost to the economy.　As inflation is 
brought under control, confidence is built, and the country gradualy integrates into international 
capital markets, more flexibility would be needed in the exchange rate regime to reduce vulner-
ability to curency crisis and free the monetary policy to steer the domestic economy.　Moving 
from one regime to another requires careful preparation to avoid economic disruption.
In general, countries can make a successful transition if they make the shift during a period 
of calm in the foreign exchange market or when there is a tendency for the exchange rate to 
appreciate (Eichengreen and others 1998, ibidem).　Moving from soft pegs towards more flexi-
bility requires an alternative anchor for monetary policy and inflation expectations to ensure a 
credible commitment to low inflation.　Improvement in institutional arangements for a success-
ful implementation of the new anchor, such as granting operational independence to the mone-
tary authority, should be completed before the transition starts.　Moving to a hard peg regime 
requires a diferent set of preparations.　The need for flexible wages, prices, and fiscal policy is 
greater under a hard peg regime because the exchange rate is not available for adjusting to an 
adverse shock.　Therefore, it is important to put these policy pre-conditions in place before the 
switch is made.25)
―　　―23
25) This refers to countries such as: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St Kits and Nevis, St 
Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Anguila, and Montserat; ASEAN countries: Brunei, Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, THailand, and Vietnam; and 
members of Mercosur: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia (associate member), and 
Chile (associate member).
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During the Asian curency crisis, the afected countries let their curencies float when they 
could no longer defend their pegs.　Substantial loss of policy credibility and economic disrup-
tion were probably unavoidable in such circumstances.　Nevertheless, the disruption can be 
minimized if the exit is combined with a firming of monetary and fiscal policies, and improving 
prudential supervision and transparency in the financial sector to restore confidence and 
credibility.　International financial assistance to replenish foreign reserves can play a critical 
role to stabilize the foreign exchange market during the transition.
According to the theorem of the impossible trinity, a country cannot have simultaneously a 
fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility, and an independent monetary policy dedicated to 
domestic goals.　Only two of these three objectives can be achieved at a time.　Which one 
should be given up depends on the country circumstances.　For example, countries satisfying 
on optimum curency area criterion would give up monetary discretion, while countries strongly 
integrated in the global capital markets would likely give up the fixed exchange rate.　Some 
authors argue that the impossible trinity poses a false dilemma because there is no reason why 
developing economies have to permit free mobility of capital (Bhagwati 1998a and 1998b, 
Rodrik 1998, ibidem).26)
The fact that currency crises are almost invariably the result of private capital flow rever-
sals, has led these authors to argue that some restrictions on capital mobility, especialy when 
the banking sector is inadequately regulated or supervised, can reduce the risk of a curency cri-
sis or strongly moderate its impact.　Selective capital inflows would discourage highly volatile 
“hot money” but facilitate the longer-term capital inflows.　Therefore, with capital controls, it 
may be possible to give up a litle bit of al three objectives and achieve in-part al three 
simultaneously.
The exchange rate is but one of the macroeconomic policy instruments available to the gov-
ernment to help maintain external and internal balances simultaneously.　It could be an efec-
tive instrument only if it is used in coordination with other instruments and supported by 
requisite institutional and regulatory structures.　Monetary policy is an integral part of the 
exchange rate system.　As noted earlier, constraints on monetary policy are particularly strin-
gent under a pegged regime: with substantial openness to international capital markets, mainte-
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nance of exchange rate pegs requires ful commitment of monetary policy.　Failure to establish 
fiscal discipline wil lead a country to crisis under any exchange rate regime.　A sounder, beter 
managed, and beter supervised financial system and prudent foreign exchange exposure of the 
banking sector and domestic businesses are also important requirements for an exchange rate 
regime to successfuly maintain competitiveness and avoid a currency crisis.　Under some cir-
cumstances, capital controls can be a useful complement to macroeconomic policies to limit 
short-term speculative flows, reduce the vulnerability of soft pegs to currency crisis and conta-
gion, and help insulate the real economy from excessive movements in the exchange rate.27)
For capital controls to be efective a number of general principles need to be observed.　
First, price-related controls are preferable to prohibitions and quantitative controls because they 
alow agents in the market to freely determine whether or not a particular transaction is worth 
undertaking.　Taxing inflows would also be an efective alternative.　Second, it is useful to 
distinguish between controls on capital outflows that are imposed to resist downward pressures 
on the exchange rate and controls on capital inflows that are intended to discourage particular 
forms of inflows (short-term speculative inflows, or hot money).　Experience shows that 
inward controls would be more efective.　Third, restrictions should be imposed on short-term 
portfolio inflows of a speculative nature which pose particular risks of currency crisis rather 
than longer-term inflows and direct investment.　Evidence on efectiveness of capital controls 
is limited and to some extent contradictory.28)
Controls on capital inflows are not free from costs.　They reduce a country’s access to for-
eign savings and create incentives for coruption and evasion.　But the short-term benefits may 
outweigh these longer-term costs (for example Malaysia in 1997–98).　They may be helpful if 
used as an addition to rather than a substitute for sound macroeconomic policies.　However, 
such controls lose their efectiveness over time.　The main danger is that they may tempt gov-
ernments into excessive reliance on them.　Therefore, controls should be removed gradualy in 
an orderly way as the economy develops, the financial sector is strengthened, and prudential 
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guidelines are put in place.　To facilitate a smooth exit from the controls, it is desirable to 
begin easing the controls when the exchange rate is not under pressure, financial markets and 
regulatory framework are strengthened, and the necessary institutional arrangements are made 
to switch to a new anchor for monetary policy which is needed as monetary policy gains inde-
pendence with increased flexibility in the exchange rate system.29)
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